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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ART, SCIENCE, AND EXPERIENCE

IN essays in the Winter, 1944, number of the *Kenyon Review* Mr. Van Meter Ames and Mr. J. C. Ransom discuss the relation of art and science. Mr. Ames presents art as closely related to science, and Mr. Ransom replies that "Art Needs a Little Separating." I agree with the contention in the title of Mr. Ransom's article, and with his belief that the consequence of the distinctions Mr. Ames recognizes between art and science is a separation greater than he seems to acknowledge. I would here like to inquire more fully into the issue as Mr. Ames confronts it.

I shall say at the outset that the question of whether art and science are essentially identical or different is not a matter of theory but of immediate experience. And it must be settled, not by argument, but by consulting our actual experience of what are classified as artworks and scientific theories in an effort to determine whether, in their direct experiential presence, they naturally divide into two kinds—whether, that is, there is something essential to the experience of all artworks and something essential to the experience of all scientific theories, constituting two groups internally homogeneous and mutually distinct. Thus the following arguments I do not recommend as demonstrating the distinction; the distinction can not be demonstrated but only disclosed, and only artworks and scientific theories can disclose it. My aim is rather to remove certain extrinsic elements of art and science which tend to obscure the essential difference they reveal in immediate perception.

Mr. Ames discovers many similarities between certain phases of art and of science, and these are, in terms of such phases, genuine similarities. I believe, however, that they are extrinsic and unessential to art as an immediate experience; further, that they are therefore unessential to the nature of art. For art is originally and ultimately an immediate experience. This does not mean that art is unintelligent or homogenous, as a sense pleasure, but that the various art objects and activities acquire value and definition only in terms of the experience they establish. The experience of art presumably consists of an organic whole of related elements; esthetic immediacy is not equivalent to absence of differentiation.

However, the principal significance of an artwork is not as an object related to other objects, but as an object productive of an experience. Art is essentially a final value, and such value resides in direct experience. Here alone can the nature of art be grasped.

In their analysis Mr. Ames and Mr. Ransom refer, implicitly or explicitly, to art and science as objects, activities, and experiences; however, no such differentiation of phases is noted by either writer, and presumably they take it to make no difference to the relation of art and science in which of these phases they are considered. I think the discussion would gain in clarity if, when distinctions or analogies were drawn, they were stated in terms of the artwork and the scientific theory, the process of recurrent artistic appreciation and scientific verification, or esthetic contemplation and scientific speculation. I take these to correspond to the respective objects, activities, and experiences of art and science: meaning by "object," the material content of the experience or activity; by "activity," the human treatment of this object over a period of time, i.e., the relation of the object in present experience to the object in future experience; by "experience," the immediate presence of the object to attention. It is, of course, conceivable that the analogies and distinctions holding in one phase will hold in another; even so this division of the problem would facilitate its solution by showing the full complexity of any relation considered, and by indicating in each case the specific referents between which the relation holds.

I believe art and science are basically and irrevocably distinct, but that they are so only in terms of their experiences. There is, as Mr. Ames observes, much in common between the objects and activities of art and science. But when these objects and activities are considered in terms of the experiences they serve, we return always to a recognition of that ultimate difference of kind which is assumed in normal language and behavior.

First of all, experiences of art and science might seem to be alike in having for their objects the same physical thing. Value and essence are located ultimately only in conscious experience; they arise there, and may be retained, or reappear, there. But no inevitable correlation unites such experiences to their physical objects. Experiences of different value and quality may be induced by identical objects; and experiences of identical value and quality by objects physically distinct. This is, of course, because a physical object is extremely complex, containing the objects of many possible experiences; there must be a necessary determination between the specific part of any object attended to and the kind of experience it evokes. The experience is nothing but this specific content which fills consciousness and on which attention dwells; and

the object nothing but what that experience discovers. When different objects establish the same experience this is because their difference is never complete; and when different experiences are correlated with the same object, this is because the object contains several possible objects-of-experience.

Nevertheless, the fact that the single physical thing is a potential of diverse experiences is cloaked by its obvious physical identity —by the conspicuousness of the spatial aspect in which the object is manifestly single, not plural. It is easy to be led thereby to confuse the various experiences produced by the "same" (by which we always mean, spatially the same) object. Further confusion may be caused, and art identified with science, when it is noted that, in addition to having the same object or subject-matter, the experiences in which these occur may exercise many of the same human faculties.

For example, a natural landscape may be a subject of esthetic contemplation for the artist, of practical appraisal for the farmer, of scientific speculation for the geologist. Likewise, a work of human art may provide wealth for the commercial dealer, prestige for the collector, information for the historian, and a delightful apprehension for the artist. Natural objects, and objects as they are manipulated in various forms of human activity, participate in causal contexts which carry them into a variety of minds and places; and the experience they establish for one mind, or for one mind at one time, does not restrict them to the same function in other minds and at other times. Indeed it would be surprising if any physical object induced only the same result for all its experiencers; and conversely it would be not very surprising to find that different objects induced similar experiences.

In the same fashion, many of the same modes of human behavior will be involved in the different experiences of the variously prejudiced and preoccupied human agents. The farmer, the geologist, and the artist will all depend, in their experiences of the landscape, upon the faculty of vision, the use of established habits or symbols, and the capacity to relate various elements in a spatial and perhaps a temporal order. Because the human organism has a limited set of faculties with which to meet a variety of demands, it would be perhaps strange if the experiences of art and science did not have many points of coincidence. But many such coincidences, as the use of vision and the relating of an ordered whole, would not identify art and science as particular experiences, since they would be common also to other modes of human behavior, just as attention to an object of the same physical dimensions and temporal location would not imply that the experiences of it were identical. Experi-

ences of art and science will be of an identical kind not merely by sharing many of the same elements, nor by being related to the same organism or object, but by being discovered to be the same in immediate experience.

The *fact* is that we treat art and science as though they were distinct. The *question* is whether this distinction is essential. On the one hand, it might be based upon something so adventitious as the frequent discreteness of their physical objects. On the other hand, the identification Mr. Ames observes between art and science might rest on such an accident as the frequent coincidence of their physical objects and various correspondences in their respective modes of apprehension. We can approach the issue by asking what is implied in our natural assumption that we can identify instances of art that are not instances of science, and vice versa.

Ultimately we can identify, compare, or distinguish objects only in terms of their immediate experiences, or in terms of the relation of their immediate and present to their mediate and future experiences, that is, by their functions in activity. For example, we may distinguish the colors blue and green by the different immediate experiences which they constitute; but other colors between which we are unable to mark such an immediate difference may be found to differ in terms of the different immediate experiences they establish when placed in identical contexts, such as under an instrument for measuring wave lengths. Likewise artworks and scientific theories might differ in their immediate experiential quality; or they might be identical in kind for immediate experience, but differ in the kind of future experience to which activity relates them. It is conceivable that the advocate of the close relation of art and science might argue, for example, that in essential quality or immediate kind the experience of an integrated scientific theory is indistinguishable from the qualitative kind of musical composition, but that these diverge in their results, the scientific theory begetting various goods all different in kind from scientific theory or a musical composition, whereas the music generates only further experiences of itself.

Actually, I believe that by both methods art objects are distinguishable from scientific theories: by the immediately recognized differences in the kinds of objects as they present themselves in esthetic contemplation and scientific speculation; and by differences in their correlative activities—by these objects' different relations of immediate to future experience. The interesting fact about the standard distinction is that it is not quite either, but partly both. The distinction is that artworks are predominantly objects of im-

mediate experience, whereas scientific theories are predominantly objects of instrumental activity. Thus it is held that art and science differ not in their nature as immediate experiences, nor in their nature as activities, but in that one is primarily an experience while the other is primarily an activity. If the proponent of this view is moved by a preference for broad yet clear-cut categories, he may identify art with the immediate and science with the instrumental; and this distinction of artworks and scientific theories will then serve as an adequate definition of each. In this case, the theory will be consistent and self-contained, however inadequate.

But the common-sense view is less radical. I think Mr. Ames is faithful to the apparent evidence in suggesting that artworks are *more* final and immediate than scientific theories, and that scientific theories are *more* instrumental and forward-looking than artworks. Then, the distinction is not absolute and complete. Truly scientific theories do have value as immediate experience for the interested scientist; and it is a virtue of the thing of beauty that its loveliness increases. Mr. Ames is so far right in arguing that science is in some sense final, and art in some degree instrumental. Scientific theory may also be a kind of immediate experience, art also a kind of activity; and if an effective contrast is to be maintained between them it will have to refer either to both as immediate experiences or to both as activities.

But this very statement of the distinction as tentative, as one of degree only, seems to imply that art and science are separately identified independent of and prior to it. The view might be that an artwork is equivalent to that which is more immediate and less instrumental, and a scientific theory equivalent to that which is more instrumental and less immediate; then they would be perfectly distinguished by being each fully defined. But I suspect that what is implicitly assumed in the distinction is that there are experiences separately identified as art and science simply on the level of immediate experience, and that there are activities called art and science which are distinguishable merely as activities.

Mr. Ames seeks to break down the distinction of art and science by showing the limitations of this particular distinction of art as final and science as instrumental. I think he would succeed if there were not above and behind this a differentiation of kind in immediate experience. But the distinction he tries to abolish, or to minimize, itself presupposes that artworks and scientific theories differ originally, in addition to the greater persistence of one in immediate enjoyment, and the greater reference of the other to future enjoyment. It is this primal distinction which must be eliminated if art and science are shown to be essentially the same.

This might be possible. It might be that experiences of art and experiences of science have in the past been differentiated by traits that are external rather than essential to them. For example, their differentiation conceivably might rest on nothing more than that we are used to receiving extraneous rewards for scientific speculation, whereas no such reward normally attends our experience of art. Or they might differ in that the scientific enterprise is carried on in one kind of environment whereas the enjoyment of art is had in another. Discovery of the essential identity of art and science would then ensue with the elimination of these extrinsic circumstances and with the experience of a resultant sameness.

"Extrinsic" here means extrinsic to the immediate experiences of art and science; for these circumstances would validly differentiate art and science as activities, i.e., in terms of their results. We have observed, however, that a difference in activities may persist together with an identity of immediate experiences. And, since immediate experience is the essential category of art, anything to be effectively identified with it must be identified in terms of this category. He who would effectively assimilate science and art must show that their only differences are the "extrinsic" ones of future consequences.

There are many anomalies in language, and the distinction of art and science might well be another. What is important is that the identification of art and science depends upon the establishment of this identity in immediate experience, and of these in their most particular, rather than with respect to their most general, nature.

Science and art may be alike as two colors are alike in being colors, and different as two different colors are different. There is a very broad category in which this analogy would quite validly apply to art and science. Indeed if one makes his category broad enough he will be able to include within it things quite different at first sight. Thus, though blue and green are different colors, they are both alike in being colors and not sounds; similarly, we may say that art and science are alike in being kinds of "experience," or, if we wonder whether this would contrast them to anything at all—whether there would be any two things that were not identical in this sense—we may say that art and science are alike in being kinds of "satisfactory" or "harmonious" experience. But we should be clear about what this accomplishes. It does not, of course, demonstrate that blue is green, nor, should I suppose, that art is science. If we were interested in understanding the nature of the particular colors blue and green, and not color in general, our inquiry would proceed, not in the direction of their identification, but away from it; just so, if we were interested in

knowing the particular natures of art and of science, we should inquire in what sense they are different kinds of "satisfactory experience." Having established the genus, we should look for the differentiae. Mr. Ames seems to do the reverse: differentiae are given, but he claims that what is essential to them are not differentiating traits, but their identical genus.

Mr. Ames's thesis is:

> Art and science are alike in having for their province the whole of experience, their ultimate motive being to rearrange, integrate and interpret it to increase freedom, to open avenues to broader and more satisfactory living.[1]

The particular arts of architecture and music provide illustrations:

> A building is a theory as to how people may satisfactorily behave at home, at church, at school, in a bank, a theater. [P. 104.]
>
> A hymn is a hypothesis of praise, tried out by the voices of the congregation. A waltz is borne to acceptance or rejection by the feet of dancers. A funeral march is found to be right by the mood of mourners. . . . Each piece of music, like any work of art, is a model for dealing with the problem of so organizing a part of the environment, or the responses of the socio-psycho-physical organism, that harmonious living may result. [Pp. 105–106.]

One can see what Mr. Ames has in mind, and in a sense one can affirm his assertions. They place art in the large context of human life and living, and here artworks have this very general result which Mr. Ames ascribes; they all "organize a part of the environment" (namely, that part which they constitute) and in this way "promote [though I should say, 'constitute'] satisfactory living." As a scientific theory may be regarded as organizing a part of the environment in a way which subsequent experience will either confirm or reject, so we may consider the artwork as a particular organization which will prove itself satisfactory or the reverse in future experience. The question is whether, in placing both art and science on this extremely general plane, and gaining with Mr. Ames an insight into the way these, as all forms of experience, take a similar rôle in the total human economy—whether we have not thus obscured authentic differences. Have we said anything essential about art and science, as *particular* forms of experience (and it is, after all, this we are concerned with, not with ethics or psychology), other than that they are both good, both desirable elements in human life?

First Mr. Ames slights the difference in artistic and scientific activity. (This difference, as we have noted, will be unessential from the view of art; but it might be essential for science if it turned out that the nature and value of science, unlike art, were

[1] "Art and Science," *Kenyon Review*, Winter, 1944, p. 101. Unless otherwise indicated all following quotations are from this essay.

constituted and revealed in mediate activity rather than in immediate experience.) His position is that while "Art is characterized by delight in what it is as well as in what it promises," there also occurs in science "delighted attention to data and their implications . . . when a hypothesis is first being formed" (p. 106). As stated, however, the similarity consists only in that science, like art, is capable of providing immediate and enjoyable experience. Other assertions disclose that art, like science, is capable of instituting future experiences (pp. 103 ff.). But the bare statement that both are immediate to a degree and both are instrumental to a degree, ignores the specific nature of their immediacy and instrumentality.

As mediate activities there is this clear difference between art and science: in the art object "what it is" and "what it promises" are essentially the same; whereas the delightful experience of formulating a scientific hypothesis is quite different from the experienced good resulting from the demonstration of that hypothesis. Exclusive of the educative value possessed by the object of art, as by any object deliberately examined, the only value which in its initial experience the artwork can promise is further experiences of the same kind. Not that repeated experiences of a work of art are identical in every detail; but there is a significant sense in which it is true that these experiences are the same with variations. Artists would be even more desperate than they commonly are if convinced that the experiences they objectify in artworks are not at least partially communicated by them—if incipient and consummatory experiences were as different, for example, as the hypothesis about the cause of a disease from the proof of that hypothesis in an effected cure.

Thus, even though the activities of both art and science contained immediate value, and though the objects (or the hypotheses regarding them) were both instrumental, art and science would remain essentially different, in that the immediately valuable experience of art is instrumental to the same kind of experience, whereas the pleasure in scientific study is but one, and not the most conspicuous, of the results of science. The adequately embodied esthetic experience is recreative of this experience; but the true scientific hypothesis is productive of values other than that which accompanies its formulation.

Indeed the adequate demonstration of a hypothesis excludes repetition of the experience, in its original urgency and importance, of formulating the hypothesis. This demonstration may instigate still more exciting adventures in speculation; but these, even when the initial hypothesis is proved true, may branch into directions

and developments remote from the original theory; and when the original hypothesis is shown to be false, this is quite likely to happen. In art, too, the repeated experience will make new excursions, discover new features in its object; but always these developments will start from and return to a central, identical quality. As Mr. Ames says, "The promise in a work of art is to renew the immediate integration and, with every encore, to banish the wish for anything else" (p. 112).

It might be argued that, despite the fresh content of each new scientific hypothesis, the experiences are all qualitatively the same; so that science, like art, is productive of the same kind of experiences. This will not help the comparison, however. For though the scientific experience may remain the same in essential quality, while the content changes, the repeated experience of an art object will contain much of the same content, and when the art object changes the experienced quality will change with it.

Actually it is hard to see any possible limit to the fruitfulness of one hypothesis in the generation of future scientific hypotheses. The process of science is everlasting and the fields of science are multiply related. Any theory, true or false, is fertile with manifold, unpredictable insights for a mind with the heroism to follow them out. This is the sense in which science may promise future delights like to the present. But the actual meaning, which is the substance, of the generative hypothesis may have nothing palpably in common with those hypotheses which later arise as its alternatives or developments. A work of art, on the other hand, is reexperienced as virtually an identical content. If the experience of science is qualitatively the same wherever it appears, this would itself differentiate the scientific from the esthetic experience, where an individuality of content is always accompanied by an individual quality.

I believe Mr. Ames does not ask the question whether there is in science a correspondence between the initial and subsequent (or hypothetical and demonstrative) experiences, an answer to which would identify or distinguish art and science as activities. Nor does he ask the more fundamental question whether in either instance the *experiences* of art and of science are essentially the same. The general direction of his view, however, indicates the answer he would give, namely, the answer of Mr. Dewey in his instrumentalist esthetics (significantly, for the view of Mr. Dewey and Mr. Ames, entitled *Art as Experience,* and not "The Experience of Art"). The view is that, on the one hand, all experiences are essentially unique, so that not only must experiences of art differ from experiences of science, but within each of these categories

every experience must differ from every other. The second half of the theory is that there is a *single* pattern for all "satisfactory" experience, and particular experiences will approximate more or less closely to this pattern. Experience is a sort of infinite variety in perfect identity.[2]

The orientation of Mr. Ames's thought to a single category of "satisfactory" or "harmonious" living, and the corresponding instrumentalist tendency either easily to mix or readily to substitute different values, are apparent in the specific examples he selects to illustrate the function of hypothesis in art. He is prone to take for such illustration instances of artworks that are also employed for ends not exclusively esthetic. He mentions a building as a "theory as to how people may satisfactorily behave at home, at church, at school, in a bank, a theater"; and in music he refers to a hymn, a waltz, and a funeral march, all of which function, and are validated as "hypothetical organizations of the environment," not merely in esthetic contemplation, but in such independent activities as worship, study, exercise, mourning. One may, of course, test a building or a piece of music in terms of its service to these other activities; but we normally suppose that the art object must also be tested in a further way if it is to be recognized not only as useful to one of these ends, but as an esthetic object besides. Science, or true knowledge about the nature of the environment, is the effective instrument in the satisfaction of every need; the artwork is the satisfaction of a special need.

It may be that science is itself another distinct need which (like the benevolent nature), in providing for the satisfaction of other needs, secures at the same time an intrinsic satisfaction. There would then be two ways of denying the essential distinction of art and science: first, to show that there are no essential distinctions of needs whatsoever—there is simply more or less "satisfactory" experience; or second, to show only that the specific needs of art and science are not distinct. But neither is the conspicuous object or method of Mr. Ames. He merely notes certain similarities in the objects and activities of art and science, and this, I believe, to the neglect of that essential difference disclosed in an examination and comparison of their respective experiences.

If the distinction of art and science is drawn simply upon this primary level of immediate experience, it is difficult to see how it can be denied. The instrumentalists are impressed with the fundamental unity of human nature; they criticize what they term the

[2] Cf. *Art as Experience;* also my paper on "The Concept of Continuity in Dewey's Theory of Esthetics," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LII (1943), pp. 392–400.

compartmentalization of man into instincts and faculties; they would substitute an analysis of experience in which distinctions are phases or points of intensification of a single basic process. It is not necessary to quarrel with this general method to observe that it requires recognition of primary qualitative distinctions in experience, whatever the place of these in the common pattern. And it seems to me that the distinction of, for example, blue from green is but a more specific distinction of the same immediate kind by which we recognize, on a more general level, the difference of an experience of art from one of scientific speculation, or, on a level midway between these in generality, the difference of experiences of color from experiences of sound. I do not know what other than such a direct distinction could produce or justify our customary assumption that there are really the two things—art *and* science—and not merely one—art-science.

It is quite possible to grant that, as Mr. Ames has said in another essay, "If the artist has a place in art, life cannot be kept out, for no man is purely an artist . . ."[3] and yet to insist that "life" (by which I suppose Mr. Ames means what Mr. Dewey calls ordinary or common experience) includes kinds of experience that are essentially distinct. The instrumentalist is anxious to remember that the man who behaves as artist does not thereby cease to be a man—a creature in some degree also moral and scientific. But if this is not an innocuous truism, the issue becomes at this level psychological, constituting such questions as: what human faculties engage in each of these activities? are the same faculties engaged in all of them? to what extent do the faculties so engaged interpenetrate, separate, differ in degree of emphasis or domination? Such questions would seem preëminently worthy of study, but they could be studied only on the assumption that there exist authentic (hence distinct) experiences of art and science, and only with reference to specific instances of such experiences. Would Mr. Ames ban such inquiries *ab initio*, contending that whatever a man experiences he is, after all, the same human being (itself rather questionable); that he will therefore use in some way part of all of himself in any experience; and that consequently his experience will be fundamentally the same? Mr. Ames will have to prohibit such inquiries if he denies that art and science are essentially distinct kinds of experience, for without the latter presupposition any inquiry could investigate only the conditions either of some particular, unique experience, or of experience generally.

SIDNEY ZINK

WASHINGTON, D. C.

[3] "On Empathy," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LII (1943), p. 491.

SOME COMMENTS ON MORRIS'S "CLASS" CONCEPTION OF THE DESIGNATUM

BY this time it is unlikely that any serious student of current intellectual movements is unfamiliar with the discussion of sign phenomena set forth by Morris in the pamphlet, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*.[1] The purpose and character of the present paper is such, however, that a restatement of the main features of his theory is desirable.

Morris states early in the essay that, in addition to the interpreter, semiosis or sign-action necessarily involves three factors: "that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and that effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter" (p. 3). These components are respectively the *sign vehicle* (sometimes sign), the *designatum*, and the *interpretant*. In semiosis, he states, "something takes account of something else mediately, i.e., by means of a third something. Semiosis is accordingly a mediated-taking-account-of. The mediators are *sign vehicles;* the takings-account-of are *interpretants;* the agents of the process are interpreters; what is taken account of are *designata*" (p. 4).

Morris continues: "It should be clear that the terms 'sign,' 'designatum,' 'interpretant,' and 'interpreter' involve one another, since they are simply ways of referring to aspects of the process of semiosis. Objects need not be referred to by signs, but there are no designata unless there is such reference; something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of something by some interpreter; a taking-account-of-something is an interpretant only in so far as it is evoked by something functioning as a sign; an object is an interpreter only as it mediately takes account of something. The properties of being a sign, a designatum, an interpreter, or an interpretant are relational properties things take on by participating in the functional process of semiosis. Semiotic, then, is not concerned with a study of a particular kind of object, but with ordinary objects in so far (and only in so far) as they participate in semiosis" (p. 4).

At this point, a question naturally arises: if the "properties of being a sign, a designatum . . . or an interpretant are relational properties which things take on by participating in the functional process of semiosis . . ." what is the nature of these *things* or

[1] Morris, Charles W., "Foundations of the Theory of Signs" in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1938. All references in this paper pertain to this article by Morris.

objects which have acquired such properties and which presumably retain their non-semiotic characteristics?

As regards the factor called the "interpretant," which Morris identifies with a taking-account-of through the mediation of a sign, he appears to take the position of the behaviorists and pragmatists. This view of the interpretant might be unacceptable to many. But at least when he suggests that an "interpretant" is of the nature of a response, response-tendency, or habit which has gotten implicated in semiosis, one must agree that his suggestion is consistent with his general position regarding semiosis, as well as intelligible. At least, he suggests what sort of "thing" it is that has the property of being an "interpretant" when that thing participates in semiosis. This likewise holds of sign. But it is questionable whether Morris has given an account of the third component of semiosis, namely, the designatum, which is either intelligible or consistent. One of the main purposes of the present paper is to present the grounds upon which this suspicion is based.

In going into this matter, it might be instructive to begin by noting two remarks Morris makes. In one passage he states that *what* is taken account of in semiosis or *what* the interpretant is an interpretation of is the designatum. In the other he says, *that* which the sign refers to is the designatum.

These statements suggest the possibility that Morris identifies designatum with what is usually called the "referent" or "object" of a sign. For several reasons this suggestion is not warranted. First, according to him, there can be no semiosis without designata. If this is the case, and designata are identified with referents or objects as ordinarily conceived, there could be no allegedly mistaken reference. Second, Morris states that there can be no designata without semiosis. If this is so, and designata are identified with referents or objects, there could be no objects or referents without semiosis. Third, by his conception of *denotatum* (which seems to be identical with what is usually called referent or object) he positively affirms that there is a distinction. Apropos of the point, he states: "A sign must have a designatum; yet obviously every sign does not, in fact, refer to an actual existent object. . . . Since 'designatum' is a semiotical term, there cannot be designata without semiosis—but there can be objects without there being semiosis. . . . No contradiction arises in saying that every sign has a designatum but not every sign refers to an actual existent. Where what is referred to actually exists as referred to the object of reference is a *denotatum*. It thus becomes clear that, while every sign has a designatum, not every sign has a denotatum" (p. 5). The designatum of the sign "dog," for instance, is not an actual existent

animal; the latter is the denotatum or referent of this sign. Moreover, it is clear that the difference between designatum and denotatum is not to be explained, at least consistently with Morris's theory, on purely semiotic grounds.

But if what the theory claims is true, what precisely is to be understood by the term "designatum"? Morris answers this question. But the answer is a curiously paradoxical one. It is that a designatum of a sign, as contrasted with its denotatum, is a "class of objects" of a certain sort, or, as he once puts it, a "kind of object."

Let us now state the facts on which the above conclusion is based. We begin by considering the question a critical reader will naturally raise. Since the designatum is identified with "class of objects," what precisely are we to understand by this expression? What is a "class of objects," or what does the expression mean in Morris's use of it?

Is it that "class of objects" carries its common-sense connotation, collection or group of objects with common and distinctive features? Even a cursory examination of the text eliminates this possibility. By "class of objects" our author means something different from collection or group of objects. Moreover, it is clear that he *must* mean something different, providing he remains consistent. As Morris rightly insists, signs have designata without necessarily having denotata. Thus he can not consistently hold that a designatum is a "class of objects" and maintain that "class of objects" means "collection or group" of objects.

Are we to conclude from this that Morris has fallen into the common error of postulating a "unique" metaphysical object or entity, or that "class of objects" means a unique metaphysical entity of some sort? Such a suggestion naturally arises at this juncture. Moreover, it is considerably strengthened when one notes that Morris has taken over without criticism from the metaphysical logicians and made fundamental in his theory the unanalyzed verbalism, namely, "class with no members" (p. 5). In the light of such facts it is difficult, on the surface at least, to see any valid ground on which Morris could meet the charge that his identification of designatum with "class of objects" involves the presupposition of a unique metaphysical entity of some sort.

But curious and unwarranted as it may seem, Morris repudiates this charge. A "class of objects" is not a unique entity of any sort, a subsistent, an essence, a Platonic idea, or what not. The difficulties raised by his position, he says, "are only apparent difficulties and need no introduction of a metaphysical realm of 'subsistence' for their solution" (p. 5). A "class of objects" or a

designatum is not "a special kind of object—a 'Platonic idea' inhabiting a realm of 'subsistence'; perhaps grasped by a special faculty for intuiting 'essences,' " or anything of the sort (p. 44). If there is anything clear in the text it is that Morris is allergic to such theories as these. He is consistent in categorically denying that any such theory is a valid solution of the problem. He is consistent in affirming that the "class of objects" theory of the designatum is a legitimate alternative to any such theory.

This stand suggests the possibility that he is thinking of "class of objects" in some Pickwickian sense, and intends that the expression be so interpreted. However, when we critically examine the text with this possibility in mind, we find little that supports the opinion that he is intentionally doing so. The text suggests rather that the terms are used realistically, and that it is intended that they should be so taken.

Are we to conclude then that Morris, in the use of his critical terms, violates the most fundamental canon of rational discourse? This obviously would be a very harsh charge to launch, especially against a thinker who is purportedly laying down the fundamental conditions for the conduct of rational discourse. And so before we draw such a conclusion we will raise and investigate a question, a consideration of which will eventually lead us to our conclusion, but which will also enable us to place this conclusion in its context of validation, as well as to formulate the alternatives with which a theory of the designatum is necessarily faced—a point on which Morris is confused from the first to the last page of his essay.

The question is this: is there any interpretation of "class" or "kind," when "class" or "kind" is construed as the verbal equivalent of "designatum," that is compatible with Morris's assumptions, as well as with the facts of semiosis? The answer is in the affirmative. There is such an interpretation. And it renders intelligible certain of Morris's assumptions, which are otherwise difficult to understand. As the initial step in the formulation of such an interpretation, it will be helpful to reconsider some points in Morris's account that have already been touched upon in one manner or another as well as to bring into the picture some not thus far mentioned.

Back of the identification of designatum with "class of objects" or "kind of object" lies Morris's recognition, although not always a clear and precise one, of certain basal facts which must be taken account of in any fruitful theory of semiosis. One such fact is that designata and denotata are different, in some respects, as regards character or nature, and that they differ, in some respects, as regards status. This is brought out in his acknowledgment of the

fact that semiosis always involves a designatum but not always a denotatum, and that while the designatum is always "immanent" the denotatum never is. Morris's arbitrary restriction of the denotatum to an "actual existent thing" is unwarranted by the facts as well as incompatible with his pragmatic theory of the interpretant. He has obviously been misled at this point by the uncritical dogmatism of current positivism. But he is correct in assuming that the denotatum is transcendent as well as correct concerning the other points mentioned immediately above.

But it is also clear that Morris recognizes that there is some significant correlation between denotata, both actual and presumptive, and designata, and that designata do and must have, in some sense, object-character. Or, to put it differently, he sees that the designatum (or some component of semiosis) must have object-character in some sense, or be, in some sense, an object, and that this sense of being an object, or having object-character, must be different from the sense in which denotata are objects. In stating that the designatum is a "class of objects" of a certain sort or a "kind of object" he is calling attention to the above facts, and trying to explain them.[2]

Underlying Morris's identification of designatum with "class" or "kind" is his recognition of two additional facts. One of these is that, in the typical, if not in all genuine, cases of semiosis, we are confronted with the phenomenon of "multiple extensive function," or, as some might say, generality of reference.

The second fact mentioned above is this: the factor in semiosis having object-character, namely, the designatum, is the semiotic equivalent of the distinctive traits and characteristics belonging to the denotata or referents of the sign when the sign has the latter; when the sign has no denotata the factor in question is the semiotic equivalent of the common and distinctive traits of the presumptive denotata.[3] Thus, the designatum is "general," or has generality, in a sense somewhat different from that of referential generality or multiple extensive function. This characteristic of the designatum is one of the facts Morris is directing attention to, and attempt-

[2] If some such object-component were not present in semiosis and apprehended by the interpreter, the so-called reference of the sign would be without determinateness and recognizable direction. The interpreter could not identify the referent, i.e., the denotatum, of the sign, or discover the fact of mistaken reference. He could not determine *what it is* that the interpretant of the sign is a mediated taking-account-of.

[3] The difficulty involved in this statement will be cleared up subsequently when we formulate the main assumption of the interpretation of the designatum to which we will eventually come. In reality, the difficulty can be cleared up only in terms of this theory.

ing to elucidate, when he names the designatum a "class of objects" or a "kind of object," rather than an object, i.e., a denotatum.[4]

We now turn to the interpretation of "class" or "kind" mentioned above. When these words are used by Morris as synonymous with designatum it is conceivable that their connotation is "functional or symbolic object," or "functional or symbolic situation with object-character." Such a conception would fit in with Morris's categorical denial that a designatum is any sort of unique metaphysical object. What is perhaps more important, it would render intelligible this denial, which on any other basis is difficult to understand. Moreover, such an interpretation is consistent with the group of facts summarized above. Further, it provides a means of coördinating and explaining these facts, or, to put it more accurately, the phenomena in question. It can also be legitimately argued that such an interpretation of "class" or "kind" is the only one on which Morris's use of such terms really makes sense and which could provide him sound reason for repudiating the charge that his position is open to the unanswerable criticism brought against the "essence" and "subsistence" doctrines.

But is there any evidence in the text that supports the opinion that Morris intends the terms in question to be interpreted in the manner suggested? The answer is an equivocal one, both yes and no, probably. Let us examine first the evidence that seemingly supports the affirmative part of the answer. An incidental portion of the evidence is found in the simple fact that Morris conceives the designatum as a "class of objects" or "kind of object" rather than an object in the ordinary sense of the term. The major, and primary evidence is constituted by Morris's basal assumption concerning the components of semiosis. We can best bring out this assumption by considering it initially with reference to the term "sign." The term "sign" is a "semiotic" term. Strictly speaking, the term refers to a symbolic function, rôle, or status. In its strict meaning "sign" means "symbolically" something else. If we may refer to that *something else* as the sign's referent, we may say that the sign is "symbolically" that referent. And since the sign-character of a sign is its sign-nature, symbolic rôle, function, etc., we may say that it is a symbolic entity.

As the reader is aware, Morris interprets the other factors of semiosis similarly. "Designatum" and "interpretant," like "sign," are semiotic terms. Strictly speaking, the term "designa-

[4] It is also fairly obvious that it is this fact that leads Morris to say in some passages that *what* is taken account of (the designatum) is a set of characteristics either actually, or presumptively, possessed by denotata.

tum'' refers to a symbolic rôle or function, or property of a certain sort. For reasons that should be clear we have referred to this distinctive symbolic rôle or function that Morris seems to have in mind when he uses the term ''designatum,'' and says that it is a strictly semiotic term, as object-character. Thus, if we may take Morris literally, when he asserts that ''designatum'' is a strictly semiotic term, we might be justified in saying that a ''designatum'' is symbolically an object, or a group of objects. This would mean, of course, that the term refers to a complex symbolic function, rôle, etc., of a certain sort. If this is the meaning of designatum, or what Morris means, and if nothing more is meant, then it should logically follow from the identification of ''designatum'' with ''class'' or ''kind'' that the latter terms mean such a complex symbolic function, or that a ''class'' or ''kind'' *is* symbolically a certain object, or a certain group of objects.

It is advisable now to examine the other side of the picture. As made explicit in the early part of his discussion, Morris recognizes the important fact that, while semiosis involves certain complex symbolic functions, these functions can not stand alone; their occurrence requires ''something'' to perform the functions, or to have, as he once puts it, the relational property of being a sign, an interpretant, a designatum, and so on. ''The properties of being a sign, a designatum, an interpreter, or an interpretant, are relational properties which things take on by participating in the functional process of semiosis'' (p. 4). Thus, even though such terms may be purely semiotic terms and refer to nothing but certain ''relational properties,'' or, more accurately, certain complex symbolic functions, it is evident that Morris assumes, as the facts demand, that the functions require ''something'' to perform them. He can not evade this assumption if he adheres to the general principles of his theory. Consequently, even though Morris might consistently say that the designatum is symbolically an object, he would still be faced with the problem of identifying *that* which performs the complex symbolic function to which the term refers. And it is quite evident from the text that he realizes this.

As a matter of fact it is precisely at this point that Morris gets concerned over the question of what kind of entity, thing, object it is that performs the complex symbolic function which we have said might be the exclusive referent of the term ''designatum.'' And it is precisely at this juncture that he rejects the essence and subsistence brands of verbal hysteria and introduces the concept of ''class'' or ''kind.'' Among other things this suggests quite strongly that the concept of ''class'' or ''kind'' is introduced as the solution of the problem. And this in turn suggests that Morris

means by "class of objects" or "kind of object" something different from a complex symbolic function of a certain sort, although he may also mean the latter. In the light of a good many facts it is thus difficult to believe that Morris means by "class" or "kind" nothing but "complex symbolic function."

Thus an examination of the available evidence bearing on the point does not permit a conclusive answer to the question raised above. There are some statements that suggest one answer, but others suggest another. It does permit us, however, to draw some conclusions.

If Morris means by "class of objects" or "kind of object" nothing but "complex symbolic function" of a certain sort, then he has not met the critical issue raised by his theory. He has not identified the entity, thing, or object that admittedly is required to perform the function in question. On the other hand, if he means when he calls the designatum a "class" or "kind" that a "class" or "kind" *is* the presupposed thing, entity, or object that performs the complex symbolic function, or which in his language has the relational property of being a designatum, he is faced, providing he remains consistent with the admitted facts, with a choice between two completely incompatible positions.

One of these positions is that implied by the pragmatic theory of the interpretant which Morris apparently supports. It is also the only theory with scientific standing, scientific intelligibility, or basis in scientific fact. It is that the entity, or thing, that performs the complex symbolic function in question is a neuro-cortical phenomenon of the type subserved by the affector systems and the critically associated cortical areas.[5] Such phenomena are the raw stuff of designata. When they participate as factors in semiosis, they perform the complex symbolic function we have characterized as the object-function.

But what is the alternative to a neuro-cortical theory, the second position available to Morris? If the neuro-cortical theory is ruled out, what remains? The alternative is that the entity, thing, or object admittedly required to perform the complex symbolic function is an entity of some sort enjoying a unique metaphysical status. This is the only alternative available which is consistent with the facts of semiosis Morris recognizes and properly stresses.

[5] This comprehensive class of neuro-cortical phenomena in one way or another involves as its essential neural basis the affector mechanisms and those cortical elements which we may refer to, in the absence of a more apt expression, as being under the dominance of these mechanisms, and is to be distinguished from "habits," "tendencies to act," "patterns of behavior," etc., all of which are subserved by the effector or motor portions of the neural system.

Since Morris consistently repudiates the "unique" metaphysical entity theory, and for very good reasons, the only logical thing for him to do would be to fall back on the theory the scientific evidence supports. But there is no evidence in the text that a neuro-cortical theory is even seriously contemplated. Nor does the text provide us any reason for supposing that such a solution of his critical problem would even be acceptable to him. The shoe is rather on the other foot.

We are thus led to ask, what is the explanation of this curious situation where a thinker does not adopt the only consistent alternative to the one he officially, if not actually, repudiates? One possible explanation is that Morris assumes, along with many others, that a neuro-cortical theory is inevitably subject to the valid criticism brought against the simple sensory-imagery theories of traditional empiricism and its anemic psychological counterpart, sensationalism—an assumption hardly supported by the evidence brought out in recent investigations, for instance, that demonstrating sensory discrimination of relation, structure, and even geometric pattern at the level of the lower organism, that supporting Lashley's "ratio of intensity" hypothesis, that bolstering up the concept of central "configurational process," and so on.

A more plausible explanation is that he sees no occasion for doing so. This is the same as to say, of course, that Morris fails to grasp what the alternatives are. This, in turn, rests upon a breakdown in analysis. Taking over the concept of "class" or "kind" from the ontologizing logicians, he assumes without analysis or criticism that it constitutes an alternative to the traditional "unique" entity theories. He thus fails to see that if "class" or "kind" does not mean complex symbolic function of a certain sort there is no good reason for arguing that it should not be put in the same class with Platonic idea, essence, subsistent, and other such verbal anachronisms.

The "class" or "kind" theory is not a legitimate alternative to unique metaphysical entity theories. Had Morris analyzed the concept of "class" or "kind," perhaps he would have seen this, and what the alternatives actually are—on the one hand a neuro-cortical theory, on the other, unwarranted and scientifically meaningless postulation. As it now stands, his account of the designatum is no better or worse than it would have been had he preferred the word "essence" to the word "class."

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BOOK REVIEW

Verifiability of Value. RAY LEPLEY. New York: Columbia University Press. 1944. xi + 267 pp. $3.50.

Mr. Lepley's volume is devoted to the support of one broad thesis, namely: "that the same general method of verification operates, in varying degrees of excellence, in matters of value as in matters of fact." A problem of normative ethics or esthetics, no less than of science, first presents itself as a "felt difficulty," which prompts us to locate the central issues more clearly and to formulate tentative judgments. These judgments must then be tested; and the degree of their verification will depend upon their coherence with judgments previously made, and upon their adequacy in taking account of the circumstances from which the problem arose and the consequences in which its solution will eventuate.

The practical difficulties of verification, Lepley continues, are partly determined by the complexity of the relevant evidence; and since the evidence for value-judgments may be complicated in the extreme, their verification is often inconclusive. But this is not a characteristic of all value-judgments, nor is it one from which all descriptive judgments are immune. There are many simple value-judgments (such as "This is the most suitable place for the desk") which normally give rise to less controversy and uncertainty than do the more complicated descriptive ones (such as "The resonance-volley theory of sound sensation is correct"); and although it must be granted that descriptive judgments are on the whole more adequately verified than those of ethics, this "does not justify the conclusion that values . . . are inherently and forever less verifiable." It may be that in the future we shall establish norms as well grounded as the conclusions of present-day science.

Having emphasized the similarities between factual and evaluative inquiries, Lepley turns to an examination of the seeming differences. Some of these he considers illusory, and others, though genuine, to be of little methodological importance. In particular, attention is given to the rôle of interests (purposes, desires, etc.) in evaluation, and to the element of subjectivity that seems to attend them.

The main difference that he finds between description and evaluation is this: "In fact finding . . . all desires are (ideally) excluded, except the master desire for the truth . . . whereas in evaluation . . . all relevant desires must be brought into the arena of deliberation . . . and the decision . . . is ultimately determined wholly or more largely by the wish, preference, or purpose which wins in competition with other desires." For the rest, the differ-

ence is only one of emphasis: When attention "centers on or is absorbed in an object or objective, the reaction may be said to be 'descriptive,' but when it centers upon what is wanted or had in immediate experience, it may be said to be 'normative.'" These differences are not, in Lepley's opinion, attended by any marked differences in method; for the organic interplay of knowing and valuing is found in all mental activity. The central function of normative inquiry lies in "forming, informing, and reforming wishes"; but scientific inquiry has a not dissimilar function. "Purposes arise within and affect the direction of activities, whether of science, or of art, or of morals; and the purposes undergo tests and reconstruction within the activities themselves." Although "normative propositions . . . do not and cannot 'correspond' so closely" to the facts as do descriptive ones, they are "to be regarded as verified in the degree that they direct further action prosperously or satisfactorily, not merely in terms of their exact correspondence with nondesire events."

The volume gives attention to several other topics, such as the quantitative and qualitative aspects of methodology, the "creative" elements in normative speculation, and the variant usages of a number of current terms.

As will be evident from this summary, Lepley writes uncompromisingly in the tradition of John Dewey. But he does rather more than mirror Dewey's views, for the conclusions and arguments are carefully re-thought, and defended with detailed reference to a number of alternative theories. The exposition, though often untidy, and occasionally unequal to the standard of rigor which current analytical philosophy is beginning to impose, is for the most part adequately clear.

The volume is convincing, and it would be gratifying to dwell at length upon its merits. It seems more profitable, however, and more in keeping with the aims of constructive criticism, to mention some points that remain debatable.

Throughout the whole of his study Lepley makes little effort to examine judgments about what is desirable for its own sake, as distinct from desirable as a means to something else. Perhaps this is a deliberate omission, based on the assumption that the superior importance of means, and the impossibility of disassociating ends from means, has been conclusively established by Dewey. Yet Dewey is not so clear upon this topic that his work can be left without further analysis; and those who, acknowledging that means and ends are inseparably related in fact, argue that they can and must be separated in attention, may find Lepley's arguments inconclusive. Few contemporary writers wish to reject empiricism when-

ever the relation of means to ends is alone in question. G. E. Moore, for instance, has written that such issues introduce questions which "can only be answered by . . . the method of empirical investigation," since "not a single question in practical Ethics can be answered except by a causal generalization."[1] And A. J. Ayer has remarked that we may redirect a man's moral attitude to an action by showing him that "he has misjudged the effects of the action."[2] Discrepancy is found not here but subsequently. It is commonly assumed that no object can properly be judged valuable as a means unless some other object or class of objects is judged valuable, at least in part, for its own sake. Perhaps this assumption is unwarranted; but unless it is carefully repudiated, one remains inclined to ask, "How, then, are judgments about what is valuable for its own sake to be verified?" It is in answering this question, and only this question, that the writers mentioned, and many others, find empiricism inadequate—Moore appealing to a special sort of intuition, and Ayer maintaining that there is no valid method whatsoever. Perhaps Lepley could defend his empiricism even at this crucial point; but one could wish that he had been more explicit in his treatment of it.

The volume suggests a further question, more easily asked than answered. On scientific issues, as on evaluative ones, several inquirers may reach divergent results, because of the difficulty of obtaining relevant evidence. But for the scientific issues it is usually possible to agree, substantially, on the kind of evidence that *would* strengthen or weaken a given hypothesis *if* experience should disclose it. This agreement is not preordained, nor does it arise without careful thought; but we are usually justified in assuming that it will be obtainable. And when it is not yet obtained, there is a plausibility in holding that the disagreeing parties have different hypotheses in mind, even though the same set of words is used in expressing them. Now can the same thing be said of evaluative issues? Or is there, for the testing of certain value-judgments, a peculiar difficulty of obtaining agreement on the specific *kind* of empirical evidence that would serve to confirm or disconfirm them?

The question becomes of interest with reference to a case like the following, which though somewhat artificial, is not an impossible one, and may present a parallel to rougher cases that actually exist: Suppose that one man, contemplating the nature and consequences of *X*, finds that his *approval* "wins in competition with other desires," and that another man, contemplating the same factors, finds that his *disapproval* wins. And suppose that this divergence con-

[1] *Principia Ethica*, p. 146.

[2] *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 165.

tinues, no matter how much agreement there is about the factual context of *X*. Would not the same body of potential data, in that case, be taken by the one man as confirming evidence for the judgment, "*X* is good," and by the other man as disconfirming evidence? And would not the discrepancy be irreconcilable?

It is not easy to see how Lepley would deal with this question. His insistence upon the *partial* nature of all verification, however correct it may be, does not provide a sufficient answer; for in the case cited the inconclusiveness depends wholly upon whether the *degree* of verification would be increased or decreased by a given body of evidence. It would be most in keeping with the spirit of his work to insist anew upon the rôle of interests in guiding science, no less than upon the rôle of science in guiding interests. Perhaps he could show, in this way, that the differences between factual inquiry and evaluative inquiry remain negligible—that the problem of obtaining accepted criteria, no matter what issues are in question, present difficulties that vary only in degree, if at all. Yet it may be doubted whether he has said enough to make this point wholly plausible.

These remarks do not question the merit of Lepley's work; they seek only to indicate some aspects of it that are worthy of discussion. In both its scholarship and its reasoning the book is of high competence, and will repay attentive study.

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BOOK NOTES

Christianity and Democracy. JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated by Doris C. Anson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1944. 98 pp. $1.25.

There are many things in this eloquent little book which deserve our homage before its defects are pointed out. Among the former are: the author's "deliberate will to hope" which sustained its writing in the dark summer of 1942; his contention that "the essential problem of reconstruction is not a problem of plans" but "of men . . . of the new leadership to come"; and his recognition that the common people "in all of Europe and especially in France . . . have better preserved honor, and are struggling against the oppressor more courageously than many politicians, industrialists and high civil and military functionaries." Many who do not share Mr. Maritain's Thomist premises would gladly join him in

his noble concluding summons to "an heroic humanism" in a world "directed toward an historic ideal of human brotherhood."

But it would be another matter to accept the author's interpretation of our century and its ills, to say nothing of his stubbornly supernaturalist remedies. "The end of the Roman Empire," he tells us, "was a minor event compared with what we behold . . . the liquidation of what is known as 'the modern world.'" The authors of that liquidation are named: Machiavelli, Luther, Descartes and the Encyclopedists, Rousseau, and Hegel. Their cardinal error was the belief that "man is saved by his own strength alone. . . ." The failure of democracy has been a spiritual failure, traceable to the tragic divorcing of the Christian and the democratic principles. Consequently, "if the democracies are to win the peace after having won the war, it will be on condition that the Christian inspiration and the democratic inspiration recognize each other and become reconciled" (p. 29).

Democracy, in Mr. Maritain's view, "springs in its essential from the inspiration of the Gospel and cannot subsist without it . . ." (p. 27). But to assert the essential dependence of democracy upon orthodox Christianity is to raise the spectres of millions of democrats who have not been orthodox Christians, and of millions of orthodox Christians who have not been democrats. Neither historically nor in terms of present statistics does the author cope successfully with these awkward multitudes of unchristian democrats and undemocratic Christians. He makes no pretense that "Christian faith compels every believer to be a democrat . . . one can be a Christian and achieve one's salvation while defending a political philosophy other than the democratic philosophy. . . ." He recognizes that, strangely enough, "it was not given to believers faithful to Catholic dogma but to rationalists to proclaim in France the rights of man and of the citizen, to Puritans to strike the last blow at slavery in America, to atheistic Communists to abolish in Russia the absolutism of private profit." Yet in spite of all these excellent fruits of infidelity, as over against the Church's repeated defense of undemocratic political absolutisms, we are assured that "neither Locke nor Jean-Jacques Rousseau nor the Encyclopedists can pass as thinkers faithful to the integrity of the Christian trust" (pp. 37–40).

But if these philosophers are not to be regarded as good democrats because they are insufficiently Christian, and if Joseph de Maistre is to be accepted as an authority concerning the dependence of liberty upon Christianity (p. 62), then surely all the ordinary meanings of our terms have become hopelessly confused. Mr. Maritain wants everything one way: good Christians need not be

good democrats—need not be democrats at all; but good democrats must be denied the title unless they can qualify as good Christians. The actual correlation, as Professor Arthur E. Murphy has recently pointed out, "is by no means one-one, for many believers in supernatural religion have shown no sort of friendship to political democracy, while among the heroes of democracy there are those whose acceptance of a supernatural spiritual order is notoriously difficult to trace."[1] In the face of the enigmatic "neutrality" of Mr. Maritain's church toward democracy in the world today, we may indeed rejoice that so good a Christian is so good a democrat, and set that fact to the credit of his faith as over against the debits against it on democracy's ledger. But his central thesis, the alleged *sine qua non* relationship of Catholicism to democracy, remains wholly unconvincing.

H. A. L.

The Legacy of the Liberal Spirit. Men and Movements in the Making of Modern Thought. Fred Gladstone Bratton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1943. x + 319 pp. $2.75.

This is a popular study by a professor of history and religion at Springfield College, who is also at the same time minister of the Congregational Church in Agawam, Massachusetts, of liberal movements and ideas from the time of Origen to the present. The chief thinkers of the tradition of liberalism constitute the real subject-matter of the volume, because of "the author's belief in the inadequacy of economic determinism" (p. ix). Perhaps in order to make the book inviting to the general public a good deal of space is consumed by biographies of the thinkers, whereas their leading ideas are summarized most briefly. The emphases must reflect the author's interests or what he fancies are the readers' tastes, because they can not be understood in terms of importance of influence: John Locke, for example, although mentioned a number of times, is summed up in one paragraph on his empiricism, while Theodore Parker is treated in an entire chapter (pp. 158–182).

The general reader is likely to be misled by casual references, which, by the nature of the volume, are nowhere explained or modified. So, for example, Professor Bratton mentions "Bacon's rationalism" (p. 88), or comments: "Some Humanists are not willing to sever connections with theism completely but hold to a Spinozistic conception of deity" (p. 280). And the layman in philosophy then understands Bacon as a rationalist and Spinoza as a theist. The general level of the work is worse when careless writing gives

[1] *The Uses of Reason*, p. 175.

way to the shoddiest kind of argumentation. A single instance should suffice; Dr. Bratton writes . . . "Dewey teaches that learning can be achieved only by doing. (Curiously enough, Dewey himself prefers to lecture to classes in the traditional 'classical' manner and undoubtedly has a large personal library upon which he is forever dependent)" (p. 269).

The author's own attitude is in some ways a diluted version of Dewey's *Liberalism and Social Action.* Personally he sees liberalism as "the sole means of transition to . . . a social order resting on rational religion, civil liberties, planned economy, and democratic collectivism" (p. 293). Unfortunately there is no serious attempt in the book to justify the belief.

RALPH G. ROSS

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

A Certain Blind Man, and Other Essays on the American Mood. ROBERT E. FITCH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1944. xi + 181 pp. $2.00.

Here are five diatribes by a prophet come to judgment, five incisive satires, old-fashioned sermons by a new-style evangelist. They are directed specifically against the present generation of Americans, and constitute a critical commentary by a moralist on his own times and fellow-citizens.

"A Certain Blind Man" convicts us of moral and intellectual blindness; "The Hidden Talent" exposes the breadth and depth of our isolationism; "The Gadarene Demoniac and the Swine" accuses us of a piggish complacency; "The Return of the Prodigal" heralds the recovery of social ideals in war time; and "The Suffering Servant of the Lord" makes a messiah of Christian democracy.

Prophet Fitch ends on a note of comfort and hope, as a helpful preacher should, but the dominant note of his sermons is one of severe, informed, unconventional criticism. The work is exceptionally enjoyable reading, whether one takes it to heart or not, for it combines wittiness, earnestness, and analysis in an eloquent style and to an extraordinary degree.

H. W. S.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XXI, Nos. 2 and 3. Logical Positivism (I): *J. A. Passmore.* The Esthetic Theory of James Joyce: *A. D. Hope.* The Servile State: *John Anderson.*

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. Vol. XXI, No. 4. Preludes to Conversion in the Philosophy of St. Augustine: *James M. Somerville.* Intentionality in the Philosophy of Avicenna: *Joseph F. Collins.* Past Errors and Future Possibilities: *Jerome G. Kerwin.* For Self-examination of Neoscholastics: *James Collins.*

We have received the following reprints:

"Our Common Ground" by Ralph Barton Perry. From *Soviet Russian Today,* April, 1944.

"What Is General Education?" by Max Black. From *Journal of Higher Education,* Vol. XV, No. 3, pp. 117–121.

"Teleological Arguments" by Archie J. Bahm. From *The Scientific Monthly,* Vol. LVIII (1944), pp. 377–382.

"The Common Man on Trial" by Helmut Kuhn. From *The Review of Politics,* Vol. 6 (1944), pp. 18–35.

"El problema del tiempo en la filosofía de San Agustin" by Raul A. Pierola. From *Universidad,* N. 10, 1941.

"Apuntes dispersos sobre fenomenología" by Raul A. Pierola. From *Universidad,* N. 15, 1943.